J'Accuse! (Aug. 19, 1939) Sen. Claude Pepper (who himself later became a Cold Warrior), from The Progressive:


By Jeffrey Sachs
Published: March 25 2009 23:14 | Last updated: March 25 2009 23:14
The Geithner-Summers plan, officially called the public/private investment programme, is a thinly veiled attempt to transfer up to hundreds of billions of dollars of US taxpayer funds to the commercial banks, by buying toxic assets from the banks at far above their market value. It is dressed up as a market transaction but that is a fig-leaf, since the government will put in 90 per cent or more of the funds and the “price discovery” process is not genuine. It is no surprise that stock market capitalisation of the banks has risen about 50 per cent from the lows of two weeks ago. Taxpayers are the losers, even as they stand on the sidelines cheering the rise of the stock market. It is their money fuelling the rally, yet the banks are the beneficiaries.
The plan’s essence is to use government off-budget money to overpay for banks’ toxic assets, perhaps by a factor of two or more. This is done by creating a one-way bet for private-sector bidders for the toxic assets, then cynically calling it “private sector price discovery”. Consider a simple example: a toxic asset with face value of $1m pays off fully with probability of 20 per cent and pays off $200,000 with probability of 80 per cent. A risk-neutral investor would pay $360,000 for this asset.
Along comes the government and says it will finance 90 per cent of the investor’s purchase and, moreover, do so as a non-recourse loan. Non-recourse means the government’s loan is backed only by the collateral value of the toxic asset itself. If the pay-out is low, the loan is defaulted and the government ends up with the low pay-out rather than full repayment of the loan.
Now the investor is prepared to bid $714,000 (with rounding) for the same asset. The investor uses $71,000 of his/her own money and $643,000 of the government loan. If the asset pays off in full, the investor repays the loan, with a profit of $357,000. This happens 20 per cent of the time, so brings an expected profit of $71,000. The other 80 per cent of the time the investor defaults on the loan, and the government ends up with $200,000. The investor just breaks even by bidding $714,000, as we would expect in a competitive auction.
Of course, the investor has systematically overpaid by $354,000 (the bid price of $714,000 minus the market value of $360,000), reflecting the investor’s right to default on the loan in the event of a poor pay-out of the toxic asset. The overpayment equals the expected loss of the government loan. After all, 80 per cent of the time (in this example) the government loses $443,000 (the $643,000 loan minus the $200,000 repayment). The expected loss is 80 per cent of $443,000, equal to $354,000.
The idea of “private sector price discovery” is therefore flim-flam. There would be price discovery if the government’s loan had to be repaid whether or not the asset paid off in full. In that case, the investor would bid $360,000. But under the Geithner-Summers plan the loan is precisely designed to be a one-way bet, for the purpose of overpricing the toxic asset in order to bail out the bank’s shareholders at hidden cost to the taxpayers.
The banks could be saved without saving their shareholders – a better deal for taxpayers and without the moral hazard of rescuing shareholders from the banks’ bad bets. Most simply, the government could provide loans to buy the toxic assets on a recourse basis,therefore without the hidden subsidy. Alternatively, the plan could give the taxpayers an equity stake in the banks in return for cleaning their balance sheets. In cases of insolvency, the government could take over the bank, the much dreaded nationalisation, albeit temporary. At the end of the Bush administration, Congress voted for the $700bn (€517bn, £479bn) troubled asset relief programme (Tarp) on the assurance the taxpayer would get fair value for money (for example, by taking equity stakes in the rescued banks). The new plan does not offer that.
Tim Geithner, Treasury secretary, and Lawrence Summers, director of the White House national economic council, suspect that they cannot go back to Congress to fund their plan and so are raiding the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the remaining Tarp funds, hoping that there will be little public understanding and little or no congressional scrutiny. This is an inappropriate institutional use of the Fed, the FDIC and the Tarp. Mr Geithner and Mr Summers should at the very least explain the true risks of large losses by the government under their plan. Then, a properly informed Congress and public could decide whether to adopt this plan or some better alternative.
Jeffrey Sachs is director of The Earth Institute at Columbia University
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009
Everybody is rushing to condemn AIG's bonuses, but this simple scandal is obscuring the real disgrace at the insurance giant: Why are AIG's counterparties getting paid back in full, to the tune of tens of billions of taxpayer dollars?
For the answer to this question, we need to go back to the very first decision to bail out AIG, made, we are told, by then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, then-New York Fed official Timothy Geithner, Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein, and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke last fall. Post-Lehman's collapse, they feared a systemic failure could be triggered by AIG's inability to pay the counterparties to all the sophisticated instruments AIG had sold. And who were AIG's trading partners? No shock here: Goldman, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, UBS, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, and on it goes. So now we know for sure what we already surmised: The AIG bailout has been a way to hide an enormous second round of cash to the same group that had received TARP money already.
It all appears, once again, to be the same insiders protecting themselves against sharing the pain and risk of their own bad adventure. The payments to AIG's counterparties are justified with an appeal to the sanctity of contract. If AIG's contracts turned out to be shaky, the theory goes, then the whole edifice of the financial system would collapse.
But wait a moment, aren't we in the midst of reopening contracts all over the place to share the burden of this crisis? From raising taxes—income taxes to sales taxes—to properly reopening labor contracts, we are all being asked to pitch in and carry our share of the burden. Workers around the country are being asked to take pay cuts and accept shorter work weeks so that colleagues won't be laid off. Why can't Wall Street royalty shoulder some of the burden? Why did Goldman have to get back 100 cents on the dollar? Didn't we already give Goldman a $25 billion capital infusion, and aren't they sitting on more than $100 billion in cash? Haven't we been told recently that they are beginning to come back to fiscal stability? If that is so, couldn't they have accepted a discount, and couldn't they have agreed to certain conditions before the AIG dollars—that is, our dollars—flowed?
The appearance that this was all an inside job is overwhelming. AIG was nothing more than a conduit for huge capital flows to the same old suspects, with no reason or explanation.
So here are several questions that should be answered, in public, under oath, to clear the air:
What was the precise conversation among Bernanke, Geithner, Paulson, and Blankfein that preceded the initial $80 billion grant?
Was it already known who the counterparties were and what the exposure was for each of the counterparties?
What did Goldman, and all the other counterparties, know about AIG's financial condition at the time they executed the swaps or other contracts? Had they done adequate due diligence to see whether they were buying real protection? And why shouldn't they bear a percentage of the risk of failure of their own counterparty?
What is the deeper relationship between Goldman and AIG? Didn't they almost merge a few years ago but did not because Goldman couldn't get its arms around the black box that is AIG? If that is true, why should Goldman get bailed out? After all, they should have known as well as anybody that a big part of AIG's business model was not to pay on insurance it had issued.
Why weren't the counterparties immediately and fully disclosed?
Failure to answer these questions will feed the populist rage that is metastasizing very quickly. And it will raise basic questions about the competence of those who are supposedly guiding this economic policy.
For me, capitalism has never been an abstract concept. It is a real, concrete part of everyday life. When I was a boy, my family left the rural misery of Brazil’s north-east and set off for São Paulo. My mother, an extraordinary woman of great courage, uprooted herself and her children and moved to the industrial centre of Brazil in search of a better life. My childhood was no different from that of many boys from poor families: informal jobs; very little formal education. My only diploma was as a machine lathe operator, from a course at the National Service for Industry.
I began to experience the reality of factory life, which awoke in me my vocation as a union leader. I became a member of the Metalworkers’ Union of São Bernardo, in the outskirts of São Paulo. I became the union’s president and, as such, led the strikes of 1978-1980 that changed the face of the Brazilian labour movement and played a big role in returning democracy to the country, then under military dictatorship.
The impact of the union movement on Brazilian society led us to create the Workers’ party, which brought together urban and rural workers, intellectuals and militants from civil society. Brazilian capitalism, at that time, was not only a matter of low salaries, insalubrious working conditions and repression of the union movement. It was also expressed in economic policy and in the whole set of the government’s public policies, as well as in the restrictions it placed on civil liberties. Together with millions of other workers, I discovered it was not enough merely to demand better salaries and working conditions. It was fundamental that we should fight for citizenship and for a profound reorganisation of economic and social life.
I fought and lost four elections before being elected president of the republic in 2002. In opposition, I came to know my country intimately. In discussions with intellectuals I thrashed out the alternatives for our society, living out on the periphery of the world a drama of stagnation and profound social inequality. But my greatest understanding of Brazil came from direct contact with its people through the “caravans of citizenship” that took me across tens of thousands of kilometres.
When I arrived in the presidency, I found myself faced not only by serious structural problems but, above all, by an inheritance of ingrained inequalities. Most of our governors, even those that enacted reforms in the past, had governed for the few. They concerned themselves with a Brazil in which only a third of the population mattered.
The situation I inherited was one not only of material difficulties but also of deep-rooted prejudices that threatened to paralyse our government and lead us into stagnation. We could not grow, it was said, without threatening economic stability – much less grow and distribute wealth. We would have to choose between the internal market and the external. Either we accepted the unforgiving imperatives of the globalised economy or we would be condemned to fatal isolation.
Over the past six years, we have destroyed those myths. We have grown and enjoyed economic stability. Our growth has been accompanied by the inclusion of tens of millions of Brazilian people in the consumer market. We have distributed wealth to more than 40m who lived below the poverty line. We have ensured that the national minimum wage has risen always above the rate of inflation. We have democratised access to credit. We have created more than 10m jobs. We have pushed forward with land reform. The expansion of our domestic market has not happened at the expense of exports – they have tripled in six years. We have attracted enormous volumes of foreign investment with no loss of sovereignty.
All this has enabled us to accumulate $207bn (€164bn, £150bn) in foreign reserves and thereby protect ourselves from the worst effects of a financial crisis that, born at the centre of capitalism, threatens the entire structure of the global economy.
Nobody dares to predict today what will be the future of capitalism.
As the governor of a great economy described as “emerging”, what I can say is what sort of society I hope will emerge from this crisis. It will reward production and not speculation. The function of the financial sector will be to stimulate productive activity – and it will be the object of rigorous controls, both national and international, by means of serious and representative organisations. International trade will be free of the protectionism that shows dangerous signs of intensifying. The reformed multilateral organisations will operate programmes to support poor and emerging economies with the aim of reducing the imbalances that scar the world today. There will be a new and democratic system of global governance. New energy policies, reform of systems of production and of patterns of consumption will ensure the survival of a planet threatened today by global warming.
But, above all, I hope for a world free of the economic dogmas that invaded the thinking of many and were presented as absolute truths. Anti-cyclical policies must not be adopted only when a crisis is under way. Applied in advance – as they have been in Brazil – they can be the guarantors of a more just and democratic society.
As I said at the outset, I do not give much importance to abstract concepts.
I am not worried about the name to be given to the economic and social order that will come after the crisis, so long as its central concern is with human beings.
The writer is president of Brazil. Join the debate at www.ft.com/capitalismblog
In an effort to review the underling conditions and causes of the present crisis, it seems that the following converging factors are true:
Real wages have been stagnant or declining vs. inflation for three decades and have reached a critical point of stress.
Neoliberal foreign policy has deteriorated domestic industry, transferring instead to developing nations.
Excessive military spending has starved the U.S. budget from maintaining domestic necessities like healthcare and education.
Like in 1991, oil interests, responding to aggressive foreign policy in the Middle East, drove up oil prices, causing domestic strife and a slowdown in global trade.
Deregulation of financial markets allowed and caused the market collapse that tipped the hand on the diseased domestic and global economy.
The world financial system was so heavily invested in the SP Mortgage schemes that no country will escape this depression.
The above points have been expounded upon by various interests and spatter a significant portion of even the lauded pages distributed by the New York Post. Here on these pages, views have come from unexpected sources, traffic has increased dramatically, and new perspectives come from brothers and sisters far away, working on their own causes. This brings us to a certain level of understanding, an even footing from which new conclusions may be approached.
A good deal of attention has been paid to the role of information technology in this crisis and the future of democracy. This is important work, since a more informed understanding of the next few years forms a structure upon which achievable plans can be erected and sculpted into reality. Is it possible, however, that technology is not yet the most powerful force in society?
There has been much said about debtor resistance to financial capital. Again, a truly massive democratic movement can not sustain itself without achievable, universal goals to rally the people. Here, there is a good deal of work left to do, especially at the ground level. Can those strategies ever mean anything more than temporary solutions to a transitory economic state?
Stand on those questions for a time. Be assured they will remain while something else takes the stage. What has been said above all comes from an informed conception of the present world. Unreality has always been a much more attractive way to look at this world, however. It might even prove elucidating to take an unwarranted perspective on weighty issues. Science Fiction has served a role in this type of analysis since its first development under the weight of a rapidly nationalizing, ceaselessly industrializing community of intellectuals. Through their visions of electric life, and mechanical wonders, these first futurists were expanding upon the ethics of their own time. The steam powered future was a safe place to explore human values, politics, and dangers without upsetting a paranoid ruling class.
With that in mind, the trends in contemporary science fiction prove useful in highlighting the present situation that is not simple enough to understand as a whole. Is it any wonder that cyberpunk enthralled readers and speculators alike in the midst of the neoliberal revolution? From Blade Runner, to 5th Element, to Firefly, deeply sensitive humanists extrapolated a world where corporate power could not be restrained from its inexorable rise to primacy. The Star Trek crew battled Russians in space, where The Next Generation brought down the wall. Enterprise instead related how the small minded creatures with a never quit attitude learned to walk the stars as humans aught to.
Cyberpunk heralded a world where humanity was lost somewhere between the net, machine implants, and corporate greed. This period of fiction predated the mystical optimism of the singularists, so machine parts on a human frame meant a sort of death of the soul and the internet was just one more tool of global control. One more consistent trait to the genre was that it was universally a Japanese world. Decades of stellar growth and a conversely floundering American business community prompted an undeniable pattern forming around a preeminent Japan, or rather, her corporation’s eventual dissolution of state power. When Japan’s economy collapsed, however, the prophecies of a world that lived under its dominance ceased to be published or even thought about.
Futurist fiction drifted to other things for a time, without quite finding a center. In fact, despite several market fads, a new school of science fiction can’t truly be pinned down just yet. It seems Vernor Vinge’s singularity is an insurmountable wall past which authors feel unqualified to climb. In the absence of a discernable future to extrapolate, steampunk and fantasy literature has experienced a remarkable rise.
A few die hard writers haven’t given up their rockets and hyper drives just yet. While no new themes have emerged, one striking consistency has emerged, the primacy of China. Joss Whedon's Firefly universe stands as the most popular image of this as a network series where all the characters regularly blurt un-translated mandarin and are surrounded by Chinese culture and writing. If China has replaced Japan as the default post-American power of choice, what does that say about what is happening now?
China is expected to post 8% growth to GDP for 2008 - once again, the largest gain out of all countries. In the wake of Neoliberal trade agreements, western heavy industry has coalesced there and in other Asian countries. The jobless recovery of the previous recession is slated to repeat on a wider scale during this depression due to the continued emigration of industry and service jobs. If it is true that domestic recovery will depend upon a return to manufacturing and infrastructure, and we folded that hand long ago, which player is going to win the pot?
Watching the Asian markets will be essential to understanding the world on the other side of this depression. China is presently investing their $600 billion stimulus package into retooling and modernizing their factories on a massive scale. While they can’t help but be carried along in the wake of the crisis, they stand a good chance of staying afloat in general. Since they presently hold $2 trillion in US currency, they also find themselves well funded to outlast the deeply indebted western nations.
There are some trials to overcome, however. The region’s inflation driven economy survives on a significant trade surplus which is drying up. China’s present plan is to readjust their target markets to developing nations, for instance, by producing low cost clothing lines that could supply African and South American states’ rapidly growing urban populations. More peripheral, but not insignificant countries like Brazil are already recovering from the crisis and this play could be a winner.
The Asian markets are holding the cards, the developed, maintained, and growing infrastructure to produce their way out of recession. The West, however, will be forced to rebuild and radically modernize what they have ignored or sold off. It is difficult to pierce the veil over Chinese politics, but with their recent adoption of the 3G wireless standard, internet access will continue to expand, a process that will result in more connection and communication. Coupled with a consistently rising standard of living and real wages, it is time to watch China for a return to democratization and inclusive reform.
Now, place this along current discussions surrounding technology and debtor resistance. Are we prepared to enter the world of tomorrow, when we lack the tools today? Resisting oppressive debt will free potential revolutionaries from burdens no person should bear, forced on the people by powers that have less and less basis in material reality. Technology and the careful adoption of new practices will ensure that these oppressed today are active and connected tomorrow, because networking is a better lever to pull on society's hinges. Put all this in context with a world balance of power that may just be shifting to another sphere. In a world past capitalism, there shouldn't be spheres of power, and we'll get there if we live long enough to get anywhere at all. A refocus of power to the Asian markets, however, could radically change to path to change.
Kurzweil speaks about the laws of technological evolution. What are these laws? How are they enforced? Kurzweil mentions competition (it is not clear if the laws are enforced by competition in this talk. If so, that would be Marx's basic view, but it is only under capitalist social relations that competition is orgianzed and universalized). Kurzweil seems to argue that technologival change is a given rather than a social product.
Kurzweil use the trem "research pressure." Where does this pressure come from?
In our study group we also discussed some of the questions raised by rapid technological change in the context of Marx's theory of tendency for the rate of profit to fall. Simply stated: the amount of human labor in each commodity is reduced by technological innovations which develop labors productivity. This causes the price of the commodity to fall and th3 rate of profit to decline. Here is a paragraph from the Grundrisse where Max talks about technological changed and the end of capitalism.
"To the degree that labour time -- the mere quantity of labour -- is posited by capital as the sole determinant element, to that degree does direct labour and its quantity disappear as the determinant principle of production -- of the creation of use values -- and is reduced both quantitatively, to a smaller proportion, and qualitatively, as an, of course, indispensable but subordinate moment, compared to general scientific labour, technological application of natural sciences, on one side, and to the general productive force arising from social combination [Gliederung] in total production on the other side -- a combination which appears as a natural fruit of social labour (although it is a historic product). Capital thus works towards its own dissolution as the form dominating production."
So I would also ask what are the barriers that capitalist social relationships pose to the development technology and labors' productive power and how can we find ways to explain the obstacles posed by capitalism?
It would be great if we can begin a discussion here, and do further research, discuss it at study group, write it up notes from the discussion as a blog post for those who can't make it to study cirle.