Isms Aren't the Problem, Dogma Is the Problem (Keith) by X.

Some notes on science, theory, ideology, and practice: Towards a critique of scientific reason

Revolutionary democracy, as we are attempting to develop it practically and theoretically emerges out of a critical dialogue with the Marxist tradition. The term “science” is bandied about within Marxist circles and the confusion over this term and what it means leads to a number of practical and theoretical shortcomings which have to be overcome if the movement is to develop. Specifically, we must be able to distinguish what science can do, from what it can not do.

Since Marx emerges in the 19th century we need to start with the 19th century conception of science. Science in the 19th century was linked to the word “critique.” The German philosopher Immanuel Kant proposed a “critical philosophy,” and he wrote a number of texts which he called “Critiques” e.g.: “The Critique of Pure Reason;” “The Critique of Practical Reason;” and “The Critique of Judgment.” Marx, almost one hundred years later, published his magnum opus “Das Kapital: A critique of political economy.” Marx sees his own project as “a critique” in much the same way that Kant understood it. Critical philosophy, for Kant, is the opposite of dogmatic philosophy. Dogma, in this conception, means simply, “assertions without proof.” Critical philosophy refers to the idea that the assertions of critical philosophy can be proved by evidence and/or reason. It is,therefore “scientific.”

As Marx’s thinking moves out of the confines of it European context and begins to be utilized by revolutionaries around the world (Russia and Asia especially, but also Africa and Latin America) it is enriched in innumerable ways, but as the power of Marx’s ideas became recognized because of their effectiveness in practice (Revolutions in some of the world’s largest countries, and leading the decolonization of the world) a sort of cult of science emerged and the concept of science became so distorted that it has, in many Marxist circles, become its opposite: dogma. The cult of science generates analysis and truths which are always already known, and then they slap on a tired slogan. They use Marxism like priests, plugging new coordinates into the old formula and out pops an analysis.

Oddly, Marx argues for a distinct and limited conception of science in one of his most often celebrated and criticized pieces: the “Preface” to “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.” This piece is most often cited because in a very brief space Marx puts forward a theory of social revolution (property relations come into revolutionary conflict with the further development of a society’s productive forces), however, Marx also makes this under-reported comment:

“In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.”

Marx, as a careful reading testifies, makes a distinction between an understanding of “the material conditions of production” which lend themselves to a scientific conception as precise as “natural science,” and the political or “ideological” forms in which people become aware of these issues and in which they fight it out. I read this to suggest, in opposition to the way that most Marxist-Leninist (-Trotkyist, -Maoist, -etceterists) read Marx, that there is no “science of revolution” or even a “science of politics” emerging from Marx’s thought. Instead, we can understand the development of capitalism in a precise or scientific way, but our political practice is much more akin to an art then a science. This, of course, does not mean we must proceed with practice without any theoretical guidance. Indeed, we may be able to approach revolutionary political practice with a version of the scientific method and certainly our practice will not develop beyond reforming the system without being highly informed by the scientific analysis of capitalism and its development. But in order to proceed we must make a careful distinction between the scientific analysis of capitalism and the art of revolutionary politics. Once this distinction is grasped then we can learn from the mistakes and successes of the past revolutions and revolutionary movements without succumbing to the cult of science.

If we can mark the distinction between the analysis of capitalism, which, according to Marx, can proceed with the precision of natural science, and the “ideological forms” which political thinking and practice occurs, how then, to conceive of revolutionary political theory? The blog is largely dedicated to the elaboration of a revolutionary political theory. I would propose that Marx’s method can guide us here. A theory is a series of inter-related concepts that emerge out of people thinking about and studying their own political activity and that of others. These concepts can be mobilized in practice and further developed in practice, becoming more defined, more refined, and more expansive. The concepts, then, become increasingly clear if they are useful in practice. The theory of revolutionary democracy as we are developing it here and in practice consists of a series of concepts like: “self-determination;” “alternate infrastructure and superstructure;” “cultural revolution;” “protest mode;” “there is no spoon;” “dual power” etc. On the blog we attempt to link these concepts with anecdotes from practice in order to make the concepts clearer, to concretize them, so that they can be useful to others but the examples we suggest do not exhaust the potential of the concept, even the concept of revolutionary democracy will be transformed with increasing practice and thinking --once a theory ceases to develop it can only become dogma.